

Part 2, pages 21-36

13. EMERGENCY AND CHECK MEETINGS

The leader of an underground unit, comrade A, has arranged regular and reserve meetings with B and C. This allows for reliability and continuity of contact in the course of their secret work. This has been progressing well. Comrade A decides to organise other forms of meetings with them because of the complexity of work.

1. Emergency Meeting:

The comrades have found that they sometimes need to meet urgently between their regular meetings. An emergency meeting is for the rapid establishment of contact should the comrades need to see each other between the set meetings.

There are similar conditions as for a regular meeting such as: Time, Place and Legend. The additional element is a signal for calling the meeting. This signal might be used by either the unit leader A or the other cell members, when they need to convey urgent information. A confirmation signal is also necessary which indicates that the call signal has been seen or understood. This must never be placed at the same location as the call signal.

Signals:

These are prearranged signs, phrases, words, marks or objects put in specified places such as on objects in the streets, on buildings etc., or specified phrases in postcards, letters, on the telephone etc.

Example of Emergency Meeting:

Comrade A has directed that the venue for the unit's Emergency meeting is a certain park bench beside a lake. The time is for 5.30pm on the same day that the call signal is used. As with Regular meetings he also indicates a Reserve venue for the Emergency meeting. Comrade A arranges different call signals for B and C, which they can also use if they need to summon him.

Call and Answer Signal for B:

This signal could be a 'chalk mark' placed by A on a certain lamp-post. Comrade A knows that B walks passed the pole every morning at a certain time on his way to work. B must always be on the look-out for the chalk mark. This could simply be the

letter 'X' in red chalk. By 2pm. that day B must have responded with the confirmation signal. This could be a piece of coloured string wound round a fence near a bus stop. It could equally be a piece of blue chalk crushed into the pavement by the steps of a building or some graffiti scrawled on a poster (in other words anything clear, visible and innocent-looking). The two comrades can now expect to meet each other at the park bench later that day.

Call and Answer Signal for C:

C has a telephone at home. Before she leaves for work, comrade A phones her from a public call-box. He pretends to dial a wrong number. 'Good morning, is that Express Dairy?' he asks. 'Sorry, wrong number', C replies and adds: 'Not such a good morning, you got me out of the bath'. This is C's innocent way of confirming that she has understood the signal. Obviously such a signal cannot be repeated.

2. Check Meeting

This is a 'meeting' between the unit leader and a subordinate comrade to establish only through visual contact whether the comrade is all right. Such a check-up becomes necessary when a comrade has been in some form of danger and where direct physical contact is unsafe to attempt, such as if the comrade has been questioned by the police or been under surveillance.

There are a number of conditions for such a meeting: Date and Time; Place or Route of movement; Actions; Legend; Signals - indicating danger or well-being.

Example of Check Meeting:

C has been questioned by the police. As a result contact with her has been cut. After a few days comrade A wants to check how she is and calls her through a signal to a Check meeting.

At 4pm. on the day following the call signal C goes shopping. She wears a yellow scarf indicating that she was subject to mild questioning and that everything has appeared normal since. She follows a route which takes her past the Post Office by 4.20pm. She does not know where A is but he has taken up a position which conceals his presence and gives him a good view of C. He is also able to observe whether C is being followed. On passing the Post Office C stops to blow her nose. This is to reinforce her feeling that everything is now normal. It is for A to decide whether to restore contact with C or to leave her on 'ice' for a while longer, subjecting her to further checks.

14. BLIND MEETING

The leader of an underground unit, comrade A, receives instructions from the leadership to meet comrade D. Comrade D is a new recruit, whom the leadership

are assigning to A's unit. A and D are strangers to one another. Conditions are therefore drawn up for a Blind Meeting - that is a meeting between two underground workers who are unknown to one another.

Recognition signs and passwords

There are similar conditions as for regular and other forms of meeting, such as date, time, place, action of subordinate and legend. In addition, there is the necessity for recognition signs and passwords, which are to aid in identification.

The recognition signs enable the commander or senior, in this case A, to identify the subordinate from a safe distance and at close quarters. Two recognition signs are therefore needed.

The passwords, including the reply, are specially prepared words and phrases which are exchanged and give the go-ahead for the contact to begin. These signs and phrases must look normal and not attract attention to outsiders.

At this point the reader should prepare an example for a blind meeting and compare it with the example we have given. Our example has been purposely printed upside down to encourage the reader to participate in this suggested exercise. Do remember that all the examples given in our series are also read by the enemy, so do not blindly copy them. They are suggestions to assist activists with their own ideas.

Example of Blind Meeting Place: Toyshop on Smith Street.

Date and Time: December 20th, 6pm.

Action: Comrade D to walk down street in easterly direction, to stop at Toyshop and gaze at toy display for five minutes.

Legend: D is simply walking about town carrying out window shopping. When A makes contact they are to behave as though they are strangers who have just struck up a friendship.

Recognition signs: D carries an OK Bazaars shopping bag. The words 'OK' have been underlined with a black pen (for close-up recognition).

Passwords:

A: Pardon me, but do you know whether this shop sells children's books?

B: I don't know. There are only toys in the window.

A: I prefer to give books for presents.

Note: The opening phrase will be used by A after he has observed D's movements and satisfied himself that the recognition signs are correct and that D has not been followed. A completes the passwords with a closing phrase which satisfies D that A is the correct contact. The two can now walk off together or A might suggest a further meeting somewhere else.

Brush Meeting

This is a brief meeting where material is quickly and silently passed from one comrade to another. Conditions for such a meeting, such as place, time and action, are carefully planned beforehand. No conversation takes place. Money, reports or instructions are swiftly transferred. Split-second timing is necessary and contact must take place in a dead zone i.e. in areas where passing the material cannot be seen.

For example, as D walks down the steps of a department store A passes D and drops a small package into D's shopping bag.

'Accidental' Meeting

This is, in fact, a deliberate contact made by the commander which comes as a surprise to the subordinate. In other words, it takes place without the subordinate's foreknowledge.

An 'accidental' meeting takes place where:

- a. there has been a breakdown in communication.
- b. the subordinate is not fully trusted and the commander wants to have an 'unexpected' talk with him or her.

The commander must have good knowledge of the subordinate's movements and plan his or her actions before, during and after the meeting.

15. NON-PERSONAL COMMUNICATION

Comrade A has been mainly relying on personal forms of communication to run the underground unit. With the police stepping up their search for revolutionary activists he decides to increase the use of non-personal communication.

These are forms of secret communication carried out without direct contact. These do not replace the essential meetings of the unit, but reduce the number of times the comrades need to meet, thereby minimising the risks.

The Main Forms:

These are telephone, postal system, press, signals, radio and dead letter box (DLB). The first three are in everyday use and can be used for secret work if correctly exploited. Signals can be used as part of the other forms or as a system on their own. Radio communication (coded) will be used by higher organs of the Movement and not by a unit like A's. The DLB is the most effective way of passing on material and information without personal contact.

Comrade A introduces these methods cautiously because misunderstandings are possible. People prefer face-to-face contact so confidence and skill must be developed.

Telephone, Post and Press:

These are reliable means of secret communication if used properly. Used carelessly in the past they have been the source of countless arrests. The enemy intercepts telephone calls and mail going to known activists and those they regard as suspicious. Phone calls can be traced and telexes as well as letters intercepted. International communication is especially vulnerable. For example, a phone call from Botswana to Soweto is likely to arouse the enemy's interest. What is required are safe phones and addresses through which can be passed innocent-sounding messages for calling meetings, re-establishing contact, warning of danger, etc.

Telephone: This allows for the urgent transmission of a signal or message. The telephone must be used with a reliable and convincing coding system and legend. Under no circumstances must the phone be used for involved discussion on sensitive topics.

Comrade A has already used the phone to call C to an emergency meeting (See No 14 of this series). The arrangement was that he pretended to dial a wrong number. This was the signal to meet at a pre-arranged place and time.

Up to now he has been meeting with her to collect propaganda material. He now wishes to signal her when to pick it up herself, but prefers to avoid phoning her at home or work. If she takes lunch regularly at a certain cafe or is at a sports club at a certain time or near a public phone, he knows how to reach her when he wishes.

A simple call such as the following is required: 'Is that Miss So-and-So? This is Ndlovu here. I believe you want to buy my Ford Escort? If so, you can view it tomorrow.' This could mean that C must collect the propaganda material at a certain place in two days time. The reference to a car is a code for picking up

propaganda material; Ndlovu is the code name for the pick-up place; tomorrow means two days time (two days time would mean three days).

Post:

This can be used to transmit similar messages as above. A telegram or greeting card with the message that 'Uncle Morris is having an operation' could be a warning from A to C to cut contact and lie low until further notice because of possible danger. The use of a particular kind of picture postcard could be a signal for a meeting at a pre-arranged place ten days after the date on the card. Signals can be contained in the form the sender writes the address, the date or the greeting. 'My dear friend' together with the fictitious address of the sender - 'No 168 Fox Street' - means to be ready for a leaflet distribution and meet at 16 hours on the 8th of the month at a venue code-named 'Fox'.

Many such forms of signals can be used in letters. Even the way the postage stamp is placed can be of significance.

Press:

This is the use of the classified ads section: 'Candy I miss you. Please remember our Anniversary of the 22nd, love Alan'. This could be A's arrangement for re-establishing contact with C if she has gone into hiding. The venue and time will have been pre-arranged, but the advert will signal the day. Such ads give many possibilities not only in the press but on notice boards in colleges, hostels, shopping centres, and so on.

16. SIGNALS

Comrade A has been introducing various forms of Non-Personal Communications (NPC) to his underground unit. At times he has carefully used the telephone, post and press to pass on innocent-sounding messages, (see No.16 of this series). Key phrases, spoken and written, have acted as signals for calling meetings, warning of danger etc. He has also used graphic signals, such as a chalk mark on a lamp post, or an object like a coloured piece of string tied to a fence, as call and answer signs (see No.14).

Signals can be used for a variety of reasons and are essential in secret work. They greatly improve the level of security of the underground and help to avoid detection by the enemy forces.

Everyday Signals

The everyday use of signals shows how useful they are in conveying messages, and what an endless variety exists. Road traffic is impossible without traffic lights (where colour carries the message) and road signs (where symbols or graphics are

used). Consider how hand signals are used in different ways not only to direct traffic but for countless purposes from sport to soldiers on patrol. Everybody uses the thumbs-up signal to show that all is well. Consider how police and robbers use signals and you will realise how important they are for underground work. In fact in introducing this topic to his unit Comrade A asks them to give examples of everyday signals. The reader should test his or her imagination in this respect.

For our purpose signals are divided into TYPE and USAGE.

*** Type:**

Sound - voice, music, whistle, animal sound, knocking etc. Colour - all the hues of the rainbow!

Graphic - drawing, figures, letters, numbers, marks, graffiti, symbols etc. Actions - behaviour/movement of a person or vehicle.

Objects - the placing or movement of anything from sticks and stones to flower pots and flags.

*** Use:**

To call all forms of meetings; to instruct people to report to a certain venue or individual; to instruct people to prepare for a certain task or action; to inform of danger or well-being; to indicate that a task has been carried out; to indicate a presence or absence of surveillance; to indicate recognition between people.

Whatever signals are invented to cover the needs of the unit they must be simple, easy to understand and not attract attention.

Here are some examples of how signals can be used: One example is included which is bad from the security point of view. See if you can spot it. Consider each example in terms of type and usage:

- Comrade A draws a red arrow on a wall to call B to an emergency meeting.
- D whistles a warning to C, who is slipping a leaflet under a door, indicating that someone is approaching.
- B stops at a postbox and blows his nose, indicating to A, observing from a safe distance, that he is being followed.
- D hangs only blue washing on his clothes line to indicate that the police have visited him and that he believes he is in danger.
- B enters a hotel wearing a suit with a pink carnation and orders a bottle of champagne. These are signals to C that she should join him for a secret discussion.

- C, having to deliver weapons to 'Esther', whom she has not met before, must park her car at a rest-spot venue on the highway. C places a tissue-box on the dash-board and drinks a can of cola. These are the recognition signals for E to approach her and ask the way to the nearest petrol station. This phrase and a Mickey-Mouse key-ring held by E are the signs which show C that E is her blind contact. (Note: both will use false number plates on their cars to remain anonymous from each other).
- C places a strip of coloured sticky tape inside a public telephone box to inform A that she has successfully delivered weapons to E.

The bad example? D's pink carnation and champagne draws unwanted attention.

17. DEAD LETTER BOX

Comrade A's underground unit has been mastering forms of Non-Personal Communication to make their work secret and efficient. Comrade A feels they now have sufficient experience to use the DLB, sometimes called a 'dead drop', to pass literature, reports and funds between one another.

The DLB

It is a hiding place such as a hollow in a tree or the place under the floorboards. It is used like a 'post box' to pass material between two people.

To give a definition: A DLB is a natural or man-made hiding place for the storage and transfer of material.

It can be a large space for hiding weapons or small for messages. It can be located inside buildings or out of doors; in town or countryside. It can be in natural spaces such as the tree or floorboards, or manufactured by the operative, such as a hollowed out fence pole or a hole in the ground. It is always camouflaged.

Selecting the DLB

It is very important to carefully select the place where the DLB is to be located. Follow the rules:

- It must be easy to describe and find. Avoid complicated or confusing descriptions which make it difficult for your partner to find it.
- It must be safe and secure. It must be well concealed from casual onlookers. Beware of places where children play, gardeners work or tramps hang-out. It must not be near enemy bases or places where guards are on duty. It must not be overlooked by buildings and windows.
- It must allow for safe deposit and removal of material. The operatives must feel secure about their actions in depositing and removing material. They

must be able to check whether they are being watched. The place must be in keeping with their public image and legend.

- It must allow for weather conditions and time of day. DLBs can be exposed or damaged by rain or flooding. Some locations may be suspicious to approach by day and dangerous by night.

Preparation

This involves constructing and camouflaging the DLB; making a diagram; working out a signal system and security arrangements. If you are burying the material put it in a tin, bottle or weather-proof container.

- Once you have selected the place for your DLB you will have to prepare it. This will usually take place under cover of night whether you are digging a hole or hollowing out a cavity in a tree and camouflaging it.
- You will have to make an accurate description, preferably including a simple diagram.
- You will have to work out a signal system for yourself and partner indicating deposit and removal of material.
- Finally, work out a check route to and from the DLB and a legend for being there.

Example of DLB

Comrade A has spotted a loose brick in a wall. The wall is located along a little used path and shielded by trees. At night he hollows-out a space behind the brick, large enough to take a small package. The loose brick is the tenth along the wall, second row down. The brick fits securely into the wall but can be quickly removed with the use of a nail. The operation takes ten seconds and the footsteps of any stranger approaching can be easily heard.

A's Description of the DLB

Reference No. DLB 3. 'Loose Brick in wall'

Location: Path leading from Fourth Street to Golf Course

Direction: In Fourth Street, just past the 61 Bus Stop, is the path, with red brick wall on the right, wooden fence on the left. Three paces down the path, on the right, just before a tree, is the DLB, in the brick wall.

The DLB:

It is a loose brick, with white paint smudge. As you walk down the path from Fourth Street, it is the tenth brick along the wall, second row from top. In the space between this brick and the ninth brick is a hole. Place a nail into this hole to help

prise out the brick. The space behind the brick holds a package wrapped in plastic with dimensions: 12x6x3 cm. After removing the package replace brick using blue tack (or other sealing substance) to hold it in place.

Signals: 1. After A deposits material he ties a piece of red string to a fence signalling that the DLB is 'loaded'. 2. After B removes material from the DLB he draws a chalk mark signal on a pole.

Note: Signals must not be in the DLB's vicinity.

Diagram

Carrying Out the Operation

The use of the DLB is an operation which must be carefully planned as follows:

Comrade A:

1. Prepares material (packaging and camouflaging)
2. Checks route for surveillance
3. Observes situation at DLB
4. Places material (if no surveillance)
5. Return route to check for surveillance
6. Places signal indicating deposit
7. Returns home

Comrade B:

1. Sees signal of deposit
2. Checks route
3. Observes situation at DLB
4. Removes material (if no surveillance)
5. Return route to check for surveillance)
6. Places signal of removal
7. Returns home.

Comrade A:

1. Checks signal of removal
2. Removes signals
3. Reports success

Note: It is important that both A and B check that they are not being followed when they go to the DLB and after leaving it.

18. STATIONARY, PORTABLE AND MOBILE DLBs

We have been discussing the use of the dead letter box (DLB) through which underground members secretly pass material to each other. There are various types of DLBs:

1. **Stationary DLBs** are fixed places such as a camouflaged hole in the ground, hollow tree trunk or fence pole, loose brick in a wall (as described in last issue).
2. **Portable DLBs** are containers which can be carried and left in innocent places to be picked up, e.g. discarded cigarette pack, hollowed-out stick or fake piece of rock.
3. **Mobile DLBs** are in different types of transport (car, bus, train, boat or plane) and are used to communicate between operatives who live far apart.
4. **Magnetic DLBs:** A simple magnet attached to a container increases opportunities for finding places to leave your DLB. With the aid of magnets you are able to clamp your DLB to any metal object such as behind a drain pipe, under the rail of a bridge, under a vehicle, etc.

Comrade 'A' will use a variety of DLBs with 'B'. Never use a stationary DLB too often because this increases the risk of being spotted. The advantage of a portable DLB is that the place where it is left can be constantly changed. Because of the danger of a stranger picking it up by chance the time between making the drop and the pick-up by your partner must not be long.

5. **Portable DLB - 'Wooden Stick':**

Buy a piece of plastic tubing or pipe. Cut off a 30cm length. Glue pieces of bark around it to make it look like a twig. With a little patience you will be surprised at how realistic you can make it. You have a portable DLB into which you can insert material. Work out a suitable location where it can be safely dropped for a pick-up. You can carry it up your sleeve and drop it in long grass or into a bush near an easy-to-locate reference point. It must be concealed from passers-by and nosey dogs! Alternatively you can try hollowing out an actual piece of branch, or splitting it down the side and gluing it. But you will probably find the plastic pipe easier to handle and longer-lasting.

6. **Portable DLB - 'Hollow Rock':** Experiment with plaster of paris (which you can buy from a chemist) and mould it into the shape of a rock. Allow enough of a hollow to hide material. With paint and mud you can make it look like a realistic rock. Carry it to the drop-off point in a shopping bag.

(Note: the above can serve as a portable DLB as well as a useful hiding place for the storage of sensitive material around the home).

7. **Mobile DLB:** Comrade 'A' uses the Johannesburg to Durban train to send material to comrades down at the coast. There are numerous hiding places on trains, as with other forms of transport, and if you use magnets the possibilities are increased. Removing a panel in a compartment provides a useful hiding place. Comrade 'A' does this long before the train's departure, before other passengers arrive. He has a telephonic signal system with the Durban comrades to indicate when the material is on its way and how to locate it. They might get on the train before it reaches Durban. Whatever the case, the operational system must be carefully studied at both ends.

19. FAILURE AND HOW TO DEAL WITH IT

Our series would not be complete if we did not deal with failure in the underground and how to react to setbacks.

1. WHAT DO WE MEAN BY "FAILURE"?

When members of the underground are exposed, arrested or killed, when the underground structure is broken-up or destroyed by the enemy - failure has occurred. Failure can be where PARTIAL only some members are affected or COMPLETE, where the entire network or machinery is smashed. OPEN failures are those that the enemy chooses to publicise. CONCEALED failures occur when the enemy succeeds in infiltrating the underground with its agents but keeps this secret. In this case they make no immediate arrests choosing instead to patiently obtain information over a long period.

2. REASONS FOR FAILURE

There are numerous causes of arrests and setbacks.

a) Violating the rules of secrecy:

This is one of the main causes of failure. To carry out secret work successfully everyone must strictly follow the organisational & personal rules of behaviour that have been outlined in this series.

Common violation of the rules are:

- failure to limit the number of links between persons (knowledge of others must be limited)
- not keeping to the principle of vertical lines of communication (eg. a cell leader must not have horizontal contact with other cell leaders but only with a contact from the higher organ)
- failure to compartmentalise or isolate different organs from one another (eg. comrades responsible for producing propaganda must not take part in its distribution)

- poor discipline (eg: loose talk; carelessness with documents; conspicuous or unnatural behaviour etc.)
- poor recruitment practises (eg: failure to check on person's background; failure to test reliability; selecting one's friends without considering genuine qualities etc.)
- failure to use codes and conceal real identities
- weak cover stories
- legends
- poor preparation of operations & meetings
- violating the rule of "knowing only as much as you need to know"
- not using the standard methods of personal and impersonal communications
- inadequate preparation of comrades for arrest and interrogation so that they reveal damaging information.

b) Weak knowledge of the operational situation:

This means not paying sufficient attention to the conditions in the area where you carry out your tasks. Comrades are often caught because they failed to study the methods used by the enemy, the time of police patrols, guard system, use of informers etc. Mistakes are made if you fail to take into account the behaviour of local people, cultural mannerisms and habits, forms of dress etc. Knowledge of political, economic, geographic and transport conditions are part of the operational picture.

c) Weakly trained and poorly selected operatives:

The underground can only be as strong as its members. Poorly trained leaders result in weak leadership, weak communication links and poor training of subordinates. This leads to wrong decisions and incorrect behaviour throughout the structure and a whole series of mistakes. Care and caution are the key to the selection of capable leaders and recruitment of operatives.

d) Weak professional, political and personal qualities:

Serious shortcomings in the qualities required for underground work can lead to failure. For example a comrade who is sound politically and has good operational skills but who drinks heavily or gambles can put a machinery at risk. Similarly a person with good professional and personal qualities but who is politically confused can be the cause of failure. And a person with good political understanding and fine personal qualities but who has weak operational capability is best used for legal work.

e) Chance or accident:

An unlucky incident can lead to arrest but is the least likely cause of failure.

3. PREVENTING FAILURE

Following the principles and rules of secrecy greatly reduces the possibility of failure - "Prevention is better than cure". But when failure occurs we must already be armed with the plans and procedures for dealing with the situation.

20. DETECTING AND LOCALISING FAILURE

When the principles and rules of secrecy are poorly applied failure and arrests follow. The main dangers come from infiltration by enemy agents or the arrest of comrades on operations. DETECTING failure means to be aware of the danger in good time. LOCALISING failure means to act in order to quickly contain the crisis and prevent the damage spreading. The following are the main points to consider:

1. REVIEW THE MACHINERY:

It is only possible to detect and localise failure if the underground has been built on a solid basis according to the correct organisational principles. A study and review of the structure, lines of communication and the personnel is an essential part of secret work. But it becomes impossible to obtain a clear picture if the underground has been loosely and incorrectly put together and is composed of some unsuitable persons. In such a situation it becomes very difficult to correct mistakes and prevent infiltration. A network which is tightly organised, operates according to the rules of secrecy and is cleared of unsuitable operatives is easier to review and manage.

2. CHECK SUSPECTS:

This is part of the work of reviewing the machinery. It must be carried out discretely so as not to alert the enemy or undermine the confidence of operatives.

- a. Review the suspects behaviour, movement and performance;
- b. check with co-workers, friends, family;
- c. carry out surveillance by the security organ after exhausting the other checks to determine whether there are links with the police.

SOME TACTICS OF ENEMY AGENTS:

- they try to win your confidence by smooth talk and compliments;
- they try to arouse your interest by big talk and promises;
- try to get information and names from you which is no business of theirs;
- try to get you to rearrange lines of communication and contact points to help police surveillance;
- may show signs of nervousness, behave oddly, show excessive curiosity;
- may pressurise you to speed up their recruitment or someone they have recommended;

- ignore instructions, fail to observe rules of secrecy;

Note:

good comrades can be guilty of lapses in behaviour from time to time, and agents can be very clever. So do not jump to conclusions but study the suspect's behaviour with care and patience. Sooner or later they will make a mistake.

4. LOCALISING FAILURE:

This involves two things: acting against infiltration when it is detected and acting against exposure of the machinery and preventing further arrests, capture of documents, material etc.

a) Acting against infiltration:

The severity of action will depend on the stage reached and the danger posed. The enemy agent may be:

- cut-off without explanation;
- politely cut-off with a good, believable pretext (eg. told the underground unit is being dissolved);
- "frozen" - told they are not being involved because they are being held in reserve;
- arrested and taken out of the country as a prisoner;
- eliminated - where they pose serious danger to the survival of comrades and there is no other way.

b) Avoiding arrest:

- The moment it is known that a comrade has been arrested those whose identities he or she could reveal must immediately go into hiding. Most arrests take place because this rule is ignored. Even if it is believed that the arrested comrade is unlikely to break this precaution must be observed.
- Everyone must have an "ESCAPE PLAN". This includes an early warning system; assistance; safe hiding place; funds; transport; disguise; new documents of identity;
- Endangered comrades may "lie low" until the threat passes or work in another part of the country or leave the country;
- All links must be cut with a comrade who has come under enemy suspicion or surveillance. In this case the comrade may be "put on ice" until the danger has passed.

- All documents, incriminating material etc. must be destroyed or removed from storage places known to the arrested comrade including from his or her house and place of work;
 - All comrades must be instructed on how to behave if arrested. They must refuse to give away their fellow comrades and strive to resist even under torture. The longer they resist the more time they give their comrades to disappear and get rid of evidence.
 - Everything must be done to help the arrested comrade by providing legal representation, publicity, food and reading material if possible, solidarity with the family, organising protest.
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